Traffic randomization / shaping

The same MESA lab measurement catalogs which raw-HTTP-request perturbations bypass each censor's DPI middleware; against China's GFW, request-line whitespace insertion and HTTP-version-number corruption (triggering the origin server's HTTP/1.0 fallback) both succeeded, and were in fact the only two techniques (of eight tested) that bypassed all four measured censors (China, Russia, "HZ", India) simultaneously.

A hands-on MESA lab experiment testing TLS-record/TCP fragmentation (via the DPYProxy tool, replicating the public "Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation" technique) against live GFW found SNI fragmentation reliably bypasses GFW's SNI-based blocking of a non-blocklisted wikipedia.org IP, but has zero effect on GFW's separate IP blocklist: for an already-blocklisted IP, every fragment size tested still failed, with GFW tearing down the connection via <RST,ACK> immediately after ClientHello for larger fragments, or after the server's Hello for very small (1-5 byte) fragments.