The tango/adc_hardware repo (author email redacted, 2019-2021) contains a dedicated "K18 演示环境交换板配置" (K18 demo-environment switch board config) commit and a nezha_monitor_K18/ directory of NEZHA monitoring dashboards/alert rules for "ADC" hardware. This is direct evidence that Geedge's ADC compute-board hardware line (documented elsewhere as used for the Pakistan/WMS-UTR site) is also deployed for the K18 (Kazakhstan) site.

The service_flow_config.properties / default_config.properties shipped in both radius-relationship-hbase and relationship-gtpc-user hardcode an identical Windows build/tools path, "D:\K18-Phase2\tsgSpace\dat\tsg\", tying these two Galaxy subscriber-correlation components' build/packaging environment to the K18 (Kazakhstan) site codename already established elsewhere in this corpus — independent, source-derived corroboration that mobile-core GTP-C and RADIUS-relationship correlation tooling was built/packaged specifically in the context of the Kazakhstan deployment.

pangu_valve.conf explicitly binds the 'PanguValve' traffic-control daemon (阀门, ASMIS_PROC_NAME=Pangu/PanguValve) to the Astana, Kazakhstan (K18) site — REMOTE_DIR=ASTANA and a MAAT_EFFECTIVE_RANGE tag of location=Astana — and configures it to receive live rule updates from a MAAT Redis backend rather than static files, tying this enforcement component directly to a real-time MAAT rule-dispatch pipeline at a named export deployment.

The T1/NTC (text-content DPI) node's wired-config manifest (main.conf, dated 2019-01-30) sets REMOTE_DIR=ASTANA/KAZAKHTELECOM/, directly naming Kazakhtelecom — Kazakhstan's dominant state-linked telecom operator — as the carrier context for this K18 deployment. The NTC_MAAT module's EFFECTIVE_FLAG further scopes rules to {location: Astana, isp: Tanstelecom}, naming a second Kazakhstani ISP (Transtelecom) tied to the same deployment.

A recurring weekly 'Tiangou Secure Gateway — Server IP and Location of Overview' report, spanning Jan 2023 through Jan 2024 in this batch alone, tracks per-app top server IPs/geolocations/bytes for named foreign platforms (Instagram, Netflix, Reddit, Skype, Pinterest, Quora, Line, Likee, Medium, Pandora). Top consumer-side IP rows consistently resolve to Kazakhstan cities (Almaty, Pavlodar, Nur-Sultan/Astana), matching the K18 site codename. Processed-row counts grow roughly 10x over the year (889B rows/week in Jan 2023 to 9.4T rows/week in Jan 2024), and one instance reports Total Bytes Transferred of 14.66 PB and an average of 218.34 Gbps for a single week.

A custom Prometheus-backed infrastructure-monitoring platform (MySQL schema dumped from source "nz-prometheus", schema "nz-temp", dated 2020-10-16) has its sys_area reference table seeded with exactly the five Kazakhstan cities named in the K18 site-codename entry — Aktau, Almaty, Nur-Sultan (the pre-2022 name for Astana), Karaganda, and Zhezkazgan — and a companion live alert-message dump (dated Nov 2020) shows real "endpoint down" P2 alerts tagged Data center: Nur-Sultan / Aktau, Project: ADC, across modules named MXN-NODE and MCN0-3-NODE/SRV, pushing the earliest confirmed evidence of the K18 Kazakhstan deployment back to at least October-November 2020.

A June 2024 IIE CAS master's thesis (author and advisor names redacted) built a genetic-algorithm + simulated-annealing evasion-traffic generator and, from Sept-Dec 2023, ran live tests against national government HTTP-censorship DPI middleboxes it labels 'RU,' 'KZ,' and 'IN,' plus open-source Snort2/3 and Suricata, cataloging per-target working evasion techniques (e.g. Host-header duplication and field-case manipulation defeat the RU target's Host-based filter; the IN target returns a ~1.2KB block page instead of dropping the connection) in a country-by-technique table, and benchmarked generation efficiency against the open-source 'Geneva' evasion tool from academic circumvention research. NOTE: neither 'ru' (Russia) nor 'in' (India) exists yet as a censor entry in this corpus's taxonomy -- flagged as new-censor candidates; 'kz' already maps to Kazakhstan, a confirmed TSG export site (K18).