A second raw, unlabeled IP list (13,786 entries, no header/context) contains dense runs of adjacent addresses within a small number of /24-ish blocks (e.g. multiple 146.66.209.x and 102.129.227.x addresses), a pattern consistent with enumerating a hosting/VPS provider's allocated ranges rather than random targets. Format (flat one-IP-per-line) matches the kind of raw export MAAT's IP-rule policy objects are built from, but this file lacks the labeling seen in 788a452cfa86, so its specific purpose/target list is not independently confirmed from this artifact alone.

The same T1/NTC node config (ntcconf/t1conf/main.conf, K18/Astana/Kazakhtelecom) exposes concrete DPI enforcement toggles: a SYNACK_OR_RST switch and SEND_INJECT_PKT flag governing active TCP-response/packet-injection behavior; ASN- and IP-based blocklists (ASN_MAAT, IPD_DYN_MAAT, IPD_STATIC_MAAT) refreshed from MAAT/Redis on a 1-second effect interval; a dynamic blacklist with a 180s timeout; explicit protocol-blocking switches for BitTorrent (DHT/uTP) and eMule (Kad); and TLS metadata harvesting including certificate SAN fields (NTC_SSL_COLLECT, collect_san_sw=1) streamed to a Kafka topic.

A dedicated AppSketch/MAAT signature object named 'Psiphon-Volunteer-IP' (signature_id 4054) blocklists specific IPv4/IPv6 CIDR ranges by ip.dst regardless of port (192.122.190.0/24, 2001:48a8:687f:1::/64, 141.219.0.0/16, and more), i.e. Geedge maintains infrastructure-level blocking of known Psiphon volunteer-hosted proxy server ranges rather than relying solely on app/protocol fingerprinting.

A signature object dated 2024-10-28 and named 'VPN servers in Russia' (fqdn variant signature_id 6217, IP variant 6216) blocklists specific FQDNs (api.tap2free.net, vpnlocal.app) and a companion IP-address object, showing Geedge curates geography-scoped VPN-infrastructure collections by country rather than only per-app-brand signatures — i.e. any server identified as VPN infrastructure hosted in a given country can be swept into a blocklist independent of which client app uses it.

An exported IP-blocklist object with the literal header format 'IP[Single||/CIDR||-Range]#[Port]' and 5,511 entries, each a single IP with port range 0-65535 (i.e. full-IP block regardless of port), includes 185.220.101.77 — an address in the 185.220.101.0/24 block long associated with Tor exit-relay operators — suggesting at least part of this object targets Tor exit infrastructure by IP rather than by protocol fingerprint.

A MAAT/AppSketch signature literally named "Psiphon-Server-IP" blocks by destination IP against a list of 1,300+ IPs (the extracted text is truncated at ~200KB so the true list is likely larger, consistent with the taxonomy's cybernarrator/vpn-thwarting note of ~70-73K harvested Psiphon IPs), directly corroborating that the CyberNarrator/vpn-thwarting Psiphon3 IP-harvesting pipeline feeds its output straight into a production MAAT/AppSketch blocking signature.

The batch contains 200+ individual MAAT/AppSketch signature JSON files, most defining FQDN- and/or destination-IP-based blocking rules for a single named commercial/consumer VPN app each (LetsVPN, TurboVPN, QuarkVPN, PandaVPN, StarkVPNReloaded, VPNTurkey, BitdefenderVPN, SnapVPN, SuperSpeedVPNProxy, SuperUnlimitedVPN, CafeVPN, and dozens more), each carrying a build date — the dated files span June 2024 through November 2024 — showing a large, actively and continuously maintained per-app VPN signature catalog rather than a static blocklist.