The TSG System Installation Manual (dated 2021-05-28) documents a three-component architecture — ADC (distributed cluster, policy enforcement/traffic processing), OLAP (log analytics, standalone or cluster mode), and CM ("Central Management", the policy UI) — with policy pushed from CM to ADC devices and ADC-generated logs aggregated via Kafka for OLAP analysis. Baseline per-node hardware requirements are 24+ CPU cores, 32GB+ RAM, 2TB disk, 1Gbps NIC, on CentOS 7.4.
TSG系统由界面进行集中管理，ADC集群分布式部署.用户可以通过界面下发策略到ADC设备上，ADC上流量处理后产生的日志信息通过Kafka汇聚后在线分析。如下图所示，TSG包含ADC，OLAP，Central Management（以下简称CM）三个组件 ... CPU 24Cores +/台 内存 32GB+/台 硬盘 2TB 网卡 1G ... 操作系统 Centos7.4全包
Related findings
An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.
The internal 'MAAT网络流处理配置统一描述框架' engineering manual (v3.1.20, author 郑超, 2021) documents MAAT's Redis-synced rule-compilation framework and its RuleScan/Hyperscan-based pattern-matching engine (libmaatframe.so / librulescan), and records that RuleScan's fast-scan feature caused a production outage on 2019-03-19 and has been disabled ever since.
An internal TSG functional-requirements spec ('加密协议JG') defines device support for identifying and blocking ECH, ESNI and QUIC traffic via per-connection SNI/region-matching tables (e.g. DF_QUIC_REGION), plus a companion 'FD报文全流程感知' feature that both passively monitors and actively injects synthetic verification traffic end-to-end through the network path to compute a live per-rule 'CT率' (breakthrough/penetration rate) — the system self-measures how often its own QUIC/ESNI/ECH blocks fail to take effect, and separately throttles logging/blocking detail for rule IDs receiving unusually high hit counts (DF_ATTACK_PROTECTION, 'targeted attack detection').
Raw structured DNS event logs (dated 2021-08-23) captured from what appears to be a GFW-adjacent DNS monitoring/injection pipeline use a schema purpose-built for DNS response forgery ('CHEAT_TYPE', 'CHEAT_RCODE', 'CHEAT_STRATEGY', 'CHEAT_RR', 'INJECTED_PKT_FILE' fields) alongside per-query geolocation; sampled records show lookups for facebook.com and tiktokv.com originating from residential China Telecom/Unicom/Mobile subscriber IPs in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Anhui and other provinces, resolving against both domestic and foreign (8.8.8.8, OpenDNS) resolvers.
A 2023 MESA Lab monthly report describes the 'TF' project's active-defense work: test cases for serial ('串联') HTTP hijack/tamper and parallel ('并联') DNS race-injection ('DNS抢答'), performance tuning that scaled active-defense capacity from 3 to 5 units, converting two existing TSG boxes to active-defense mode, and rewriting the active-defense flow-control logic to no longer depend on sapp.
The T1/NTC (text-content DPI) node's wired-config manifest (main.conf, dated 2019-01-30) sets REMOTE_DIR=ASTANA/KAZAKHTELECOM/, directly naming Kazakhtelecom — Kazakhstan's dominant state-linked telecom operator — as the carrier context for this K18 deployment. The NTC_MAAT module's EFFECTIVE_FLAG further scopes rules to {location: Astana, isp: Tanstelecom}, naming a second Kazakhstani ISP (Transtelecom) tied to the same deployment.