Commit history for the K18 (Kazakhstan) argus-ntc console reveals its concrete feature set: a scheduled "网页关键字定时器" (webpage-keyword timer/scheduler) for keyword filtering, ASN/IP block-list configuration pages, a "BGP泛收" (BGP wide-collection) page, an SSL-interception config toggle, a file-scanning results page with MALWARE TYPE/MALWARE NAME columns, app-identification entries including a WhatsApp rename, and a VoIP business-config approval workflow, with blocking actions relabeled from "阻断" (block) to "封堵(丢弃)" (interdict/drop).

The GitLab group itself is named "K18_NTCS_WEB" (K18 = Kazakhstan), and its "nfs" web app implements per-protocol keyword-filter configuration classes (App/FTP/Mail/P2P/SSL keyword configs), an OpenVPN IP-list config, RADIUS-based logging/reporting entities, MAAT rule-sync beans, and an explicit "IP spoofing" business feature with its own "PXY仿冒地址池" (proxy spoofed-address pool) and dedicated policy-log support -- the single strongest piece of evidence in this batch tying named keyword-filtering plus IP-spoofing capabilities directly to the Kazakhstan deployment.

The PanGu/mesa_plug bundle (2019) shows the plugin framework's config layout with an explicit http_url_filter.conf plugin config and a dedicated ntc_bgp_plug submodule alongside asn_tableinfo.conf and IP-deny table config, confirming both URL-based content filtering and BGP-feed-driven ASN/prefix blocking are first-class, separately-configured plugins within the DPI stack (not just SNI/IP list matching).

The same T1/NTC node config (ntcconf/t1conf/main.conf, K18/Astana/Kazakhtelecom) exposes concrete DPI enforcement toggles: a SYNACK_OR_RST switch and SEND_INJECT_PKT flag governing active TCP-response/packet-injection behavior; ASN- and IP-based blocklists (ASN_MAAT, IPD_DYN_MAAT, IPD_STATIC_MAAT) refreshed from MAAT/Redis on a 1-second effect interval; a dynamic blacklist with a 180s timeout; explicit protocol-blocking switches for BitTorrent (DHT/uTP) and eMule (Kad); and TLS metadata harvesting including certificate SAN fields (NTC_SSL_COLLECT, collect_san_sw=1) streamed to a Kafka topic.

A weekly operational report documents newly-added blocking rules for 25 mobile apps (18 hosted overseas, mostly on Hong Kong-region Azure/Alibaba/Tencent cloud IPs), where analysts extract each app's domains, IPs, and distinctive URL paths (e.g. '/tigase/getLastChatList', '/user/getUserMoney') and log 'system disposition: newly added blocking action' for every one; matching raw keyword-object exports using the identical URL-path style confirm these hand-extracted paths are loaded directly as live filter-list entries in production.

An internal "business log loading interface" spec enumerates the platform's full censorship/surveillance taxonomy as three parallel log streams (管控/blocking, 监测/monitoring, and 一般/general) each covering the same roughly 13 categories -- IP blacklist, DNS spoofing, URL, website, specific-certificate, webpage-keyword, email-keyword, FTP-keyword, search-term, email, VPN, instant-messaging, and social-app -- fed via HTTP POST/Avro to a "front-end big data platform," with source/destination geolocation fields explicitly keyed to a carrier-supplied "疆外" (outside-Xinjiang) IP-location database.

A TSG/sapp signature bundle dated 2024-06-17 defines a single 'Express VPN_Patch01' application (app_id 15190) matched by three independently OR'd signature layers -- an FQDN blocklist (expressvpn.com and ~7 domain variants), a destination-IP blocklist of roughly 150 addresses, and a raw UDP payload byte-pattern match anchored by offset/depth against ExpressVPN's Lightway protocol handshake bytes -- tied to an explicit enforcement action of dropping matched traffic.