A master AppSketch-format signature file mixes hundreds of domestic-app identification rules (iQiyi, JD.com, Tencent, Xiaomi Store, China Construction Bank, China Merchants Bank, Postal Savings Bank, Baidu Netdisk, government tax/medical portals) with foreign-VPN detection rules (BeePassVPN, BetternetVPN, BigMamaVPN, BravePrivateVPN, JumpJumpVPN, QuarkVPN, SecureVPN, VPNHero, VPNLite, VPNTurkey, etc.) inside the same rule framework and file, confirming VPN/ circumvention-tool detection is built on the identical general-purpose app-ID engine used for ordinary commercial app traffic classification, not a separate subsystem.

Exported AppSketch/MAAT signature-object JSON shows named per-VPN detection rules combining multiple independent vectors: CyberGhost's WireGuard variant is matched by a hex UDP-payload pattern (04000000*), destination port 1337, and ip.proto=17 together (signature cyberghostvpn_wireguard); Windscribe's OpenVPN control channel is matched by two offset-anchored hex byte patterns plus an exact 86-byte payload length (windscribevpn_openvpn_payload); and ExpressVPN is matched independently via a literal JA3 hash (ssl.analysis.ja3), FQDN strings (expressapisv2.com, www.expressvpn.works), and a large enumerated IP list (700+ individual ip.dst entries observed before the 200KB text-extraction cutoff).

A dedicated AppSketch/MAAT signature object named 'Psiphon-Volunteer-IP' (signature_id 4054) blocklists specific IPv4/IPv6 CIDR ranges by ip.dst regardless of port (192.122.190.0/24, 2001:48a8:687f:1::/64, 141.219.0.0/16, and more), i.e. Geedge maintains infrastructure-level blocking of known Psiphon volunteer-hosted proxy server ranges rather than relying solely on app/protocol fingerprinting.

A signature object dated 2024-10-28 and named 'VPN servers in Russia' (fqdn variant signature_id 6217, IP variant 6216) blocklists specific FQDNs (api.tap2free.net, vpnlocal.app) and a companion IP-address object, showing Geedge curates geography-scoped VPN-infrastructure collections by country rather than only per-app-brand signatures — i.e. any server identified as VPN infrastructure hosted in a given country can be swept into a blocklist independent of which client app uses it.

MAAT/AppSketch signatures "turbovpn_udp_payload1"/"turbovpn_udp_payload2" detect Turbo VPN by matching a literal hex-encoded ASCII string in the UDP payload — keyword "$747572626f76706e0a00" decodes to the plaintext bytes "turbovpn\n\x00" — plus a second offset-anchored byte pattern, meaning Turbo VPN's own protocol handshake leaks a recognizable, unencrypted magic string that the DPI engine matches directly rather than needing any statistical or behavioral analysis.

The batch contains 200+ individual MAAT/AppSketch signature JSON files, most defining FQDN- and/or destination-IP-based blocking rules for a single named commercial/consumer VPN app each (LetsVPN, TurboVPN, QuarkVPN, PandaVPN, StarkVPNReloaded, VPNTurkey, BitdefenderVPN, SnapVPN, SuperSpeedVPNProxy, SuperUnlimitedVPN, CafeVPN, and dozens more), each carrying a build date — the dated files span June 2024 through November 2024 — showing a large, actively and continuously maintained per-app VPN signature catalog rather than a static blocklist.

The AppSketch/MAAT signature system contains a systematically dated, patch-versioned catalog of FQDN-based detection signatures for dozens of individually named commercial VPN apps (e.g. V2VPN, V2Netvpn, Turbo VPN, LetsVPN, AdGuard VPN, Avira Phantom VPN, TouchVPN, FinchVPN, Opera VPN, Ultrasurf VPN, GoFly VPN), each modeled as an 'app' object in category 'networking' / subcategory 'tunnels' whose default deny_action drops the flow while sending both an ICMP-unreachable and a TCP RST to the client. At least 35 such distinct VPN-app signature objects appear in this batch alone, dated July-November 2024, with repeated 'Patch0N' revisions to the same app as its domains rotate.