'AppSketch Works' (internal Chinese name: 特征工厂, 'Feature Factory') is a formal, dedicated internal product -- not an ad hoc script -- for managing extraction, verification, and distribution of app/VPN blocking signatures ('APP Sketch DB') across all TSG deployments including export customers.
AppSketch Works是TSG生态的一款新产品，用于管理提取验证APP特征，中文名：特征工厂
Defense implications
- Confirms a centrally-maintained, versioned signature database (APP Sketch DB) is pushed to all deployments, domestic and exported alike -- a technique fingerprinted once (domestically or anywhere) is expected to propagate to every customer's system via routine DB updates, not stay siloed to where it was discovered.
Related findings
Beyond VPN/circumvention tools, the same exported signature format is used at large scale for ordinary consumer apps — e.g. a Bank of Communications ('jiaotongyinhang') signature matches four exact-match DNS query names (download1.bankcomm.com, mobile.95559.com.cn, mbank.95559.com.cn, monitor.bankcomm.cn), and other entries (huolala, qidiandushu, zhihu) use the newer dns.qname/ssl.sni/http.host/quic.sni four-vector pattern per app. A companion artifact (70707a230d7d) is a flat list of thousands of specific URL paths (not just domains) spanning news, e-commerce, government-adjacent, and international press sites — consistent with the fqdn_category_list field seen in TSG's session-log schema, i.e. this is categorization/classification reference data, not solely a VPN blocklist.
Exported AppSketch/MAAT signature-object JSON shows named per-VPN detection rules combining multiple independent vectors: CyberGhost's WireGuard variant is matched by a hex UDP-payload pattern (04000000*), destination port 1337, and ip.proto=17 together (signature cyberghostvpn_wireguard); Windscribe's OpenVPN control channel is matched by two offset-anchored hex byte patterns plus an exact 86-byte payload length (windscribevpn_openvpn_payload); and ExpressVPN is matched independently via a literal JA3 hash (ssl.analysis.ja3), FQDN strings (expressapisv2.com, www.expressvpn.works), and a large enumerated IP list (700+ individual ip.dst entries observed before the 200KB text-extraction cutoff).
A dedicated AppSketch/MAAT signature object named 'Psiphon-Volunteer-IP' (signature_id 4054) blocklists specific IPv4/IPv6 CIDR ranges by ip.dst regardless of port (192.122.190.0/24, 2001:48a8:687f:1::/64, 141.219.0.0/16, and more), i.e. Geedge maintains infrastructure-level blocking of known Psiphon volunteer-hosted proxy server ranges rather than relying solely on app/protocol fingerprinting.
A signature object dated 2024-10-28 and named 'VPN servers in Russia' (fqdn variant signature_id 6217, IP variant 6216) blocklists specific FQDNs (api.tap2free.net, vpnlocal.app) and a companion IP-address object, showing Geedge curates geography-scoped VPN-infrastructure collections by country rather than only per-app-brand signatures — i.e. any server identified as VPN infrastructure hosted in a given country can be swept into a blocklist independent of which client app uses it.
Live TSG session logs from an internal test/QA gateway (device_id 9800165603191146 / 21426003, data_center label XXG-TSG-BJ) show real sessions from named commercial VPN apps — AlohaBrowserLite, BeePassVPN, BravePrivateVPN (WireGuard), Proton VPN, Turbo VPN, CyberGhost, BetternetVPN, SuperUnlimitedVPN, TrustzoneVPN and VPNHero — each matched to a dedicated per-app security rule (e.g. Deny_Brave, Deny_BeePassvpn, deny_Super Unlimited VPN) and given security_action=Deny. One row's app_transition field records a layered classification chain 'Psiphon Provider' -> ... -> 'BravePrivateVPN' for a single session, indicating the engine attempts nested/tunnel-in-tunnel protocol identification, not just single-label app ID.
A recurring weekly '[Xinjiang Unicom/Xinjiang Mobile] Traffic Analysis Report' (新疆联通/移动流量分析报告), produced by a 'Carrier Front-End Analysis Team' (运营商前端分析团队), spans Feb-Jul 2023 in this batch. It reports each carrier's total/access bandwidth (Xinjiang Unicom: 1.88 Tbps total, 880 Gbps access; Xinjiang Mobile: 4.4 Tbps total, 1 Tbps access) and per-app server-IP/location/traffic breakdowns for 31 named foreign platforms including Telegram, WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, Discord, Snapchat, Gmail and YouTube, alongside domestic-app sections — direct evidence of an ongoing, carrier-integrated domestic monitoring program for China's Xinjiang region.