Confirms a TSG-X/TSG-OS (v22.11) deployment at "新疆联通IDC" (Xinjiang Unicom IDC, a specific China Unicom data center), part of a domestic "XJ-NPM" project; core traffic-processing components are named "mrzcpd" and "sapp," both required to start successfully for the appliance to function.

An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.

TSG ships a built-in offensive "active defense" (主动防御) module named houyi (后羿), built on the sapp/marsio/mrzcpd stack, that performs spoofed-source-IP network-layer flood attacks, DNS/NTP/Memcached reflection-amplification attacks, and application-layer (HTTP/HTTPS) CC floods against a configured target. Spoofed source IPs are drawn from named CIDR-range "profiles" (e.g. 10.1.1.0/24), and policy is distributed via Redis and issued either through an interface called "安天" (Antiy) or by directly calling a "毕方" (Bifang) API. Deployment is via Ansible from git.mesalab.cn/tsg/houyi-deploy, packaged as RPMs installed under /opt/houyi and as sapp plugins under /home/mesasoft/sapp_run/plug.

An official "Geedge Networks Confidential And Proprietary" sapp/mrzcpd operations manual documents the packet-injection API (MESA_kill_tcp / MESA_inject_pkt) used for both out-of-band mirror-tap RST injection (relies on the local box's own IP routing table to send) and inline in-path injection (requires mrtunnat.conf tunnel-tracking state -- use_recent_tunnel, use_link_info_table -- keyed on outer/inner MAC and link_id/link_dir), plus the Marsio DPDK-based driver's I/O sub-modes (marsio4, marsio_vxlan, pag_marsio, agent_smith) and its role extracting VXLAN/GTP encapsulation metadata and stamping link/circuit identifiers into mirrored packets' MAC field for session-log correlation.

A June 2021 MESA Lab test report ("精管流量初步分析报告") measured a live TLS-decryption pipeline feeding two sapp instances -- sapp A ingesting raw encrypted traffic via mrzcpd, sapp B ingesting plaintext from a third-party decryption platform over a Unix domain socket -- and found decrypted plaintext covered only 4.85% of raw traffic bytes and 7.4% of port-443 connections, with average MITM decryption latency of 1741ms (range 158-6000ms) across 2957 matched connections.

The tango/tsg-service-chaining-engine (SCE) repo implements TSG's traffic-steering core: it VXLAN-encapsulates and routes both "raw" and "decrypted" copies of a session (four tracked metadata directions) through a chain of up to 32 third-party "Service Functions", with explicit per-flow actions of block, bypass, forward, and rx_drop for both mirrored and inline-steered traffic, coordinating with SAPP, mrzcpd (packet capture/re-injection), and MAAT4 (rule engine) via control-plane messages.

Geedge's production inline-deployment container bundle (tango/tsg_container) wires mrzcpd (capture/inject), sapp (DPI via maat rules), and a third component "tfe" (traffic-forwarding engine) together via Docker Compose; tfe ships a dedicated doh.conf (DNS-over-HTTPS handling) and the firewall-mode container's sapp config includes a send_raw_pkt.conf, a KNI (kernel network interface) config, an "asymmetric_presence_layer.conf" for mirror/asymmetric-routing deployments, and a "pangu" proxy module (pangu_pxy.conf / pangu_http.json).