Documents the exact methodology used to derive a block signature for 'Giti VPN': TLS interception (fiddler) to decrypt the app's traffic, identifying its control/initialization domain and a second per-session domain pattern, then blocking by those two domain-name features rather than deep packet content.
使用fiddler解密，发现Giti VPN打开软件去访问www.ggitgpnv.info域名进行初始化，点击连接也会去访问www.ggitgpnv.info域名，获取到一个以GvgfvgiTI24.xyz（不区分大小写）结尾的域名...使用$www.ggitgpnv.info和*.GvgfvgiTI24.xyz两个域名特征即可阻断VPN；在228环境测试无CT。
Defense implications
- Confirms active TLS-interception (not just passive SNI/fingerprint analysis) is part of the signature-derivation workflow — VPN apps whose control-plane domains rotate per-session or are learned dynamically (not hardcoded) are harder to fingerprint this way.
Related findings
M22's extraction against "VPN Hero" (OpenVPN-based) recovered 13 FQDN + 13 IP indicators; FQDNs follow a "zampakuto...shop" template. Post-signature testing in the Myanmar demo environment found no successful connections on Android/iOS.
A dedicated internal "运营商前端分析团队" (Carrier Front-end Analysis Team) produces weekly, carrier-specific traffic-analysis reports explicitly titled "新疆移动流量分析报告" (Xinjiang Mobile Traffic Analysis Report) and "新疆联通流量分析报告" (Xinjiang Unicom Traffic Analysis Report), with instances dated from at least July 2022 through March 2024. One instance (Xinjiang Mobile, 2023-05-15) reports total carrier bandwidth of 4.4Tbps (1Tbps access bandwidth), 27.34PB of weekly throughput, 123 distinct identified application-layer protocols, and a section (4.1, pages 17+) explicitly tracking server IP/location for 28 named overseas apps (BBC, Discord, ESPN, Facebook, Gmail, Google, Hulu, Instagram, Netflix, Reddit, Skype, Telegram, Twitter, Uber, WhatsApp, Wikipedia, YouTube, Zoom, etc.).
A recurring weekly 'Tiangou Secure Gateway / Server IP and Location of Overseas APP' report series tracks per-app server-IP geolocation for Instagram, Snapchat, Telegram, and Likee traffic, with entries repeatedly geolocated to Almaty, Pavlodar, and Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan across late 2023-early 2024 -- consistent with (though not conclusive proof of on its own, given ambiguity over whether the geolocated IPs are CDN edge nodes or another artifact) an operating Kazakhstan TSG deployment continuously monitoring named social/messaging platforms.
Raw TSG session_record export logs dated Nov 2024, tagged device_group 'YGN-MYTEL' (Yangon, Mytel), directly corroborate the leak's M22=Myanmar/Mytel/Yangon site-codename mapping with live production data: individual SSL sessions are classified by app as 'Hotspot Shield VPN' (destination get.adobe.com, likely a fronting/CDN endpoint) and allowed under a named whitelist rule 'whitelist_102024', geolocated client-side as Myanmar.Yangon.Yangon.
MESA_Platform's "quic" module (built and packaged as stellar-on-sapp/sapp RPMs) implements SNI/User-Agent extraction from both cleartext GQUIC (versions 23-59) and encrypted IETF QUIC RFC9000 ClientHello payloads, and supports a QUIC SNI whitelist -- i.e. the DPI pipeline decrypts/parses encrypted QUIC handshakes to recover the destination domain rather than being blocked by QUIC's encryption.
TSG23.07 added support for FQDN substring matching (vs. exact/wildcard only) for the P19 deployment, a detection-capability upgrade.