MESA Lab engineering logs (2020) describe development and TSG-environment testing of a SAPP plugin that identifies encrypted audio/video traffic and distinguishes on-demand from live streams. The workflow uses Fiddler (a TLS MITM proxy) to decrypt traffic client-side and auto-label training data for the underlying ML model, and required a dlopen() workaround to load libpython.so for the model at runtime.

A performance bug at a domestic Xinjiang test site (25-70Gbps) traced packet-processing lock contention to a plugin named "tsg_vulpes" calling an ONNX Runtime model for real-time "encrypted voice recognition" on live traffic; disabling this ML classifier resolved packet loss, indicating it's an optional, performance-costly add-on.

An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.

The internal 'MAAT网络流处理配置统一描述框架' engineering manual (v3.1.20, author 郑超, 2021) documents MAAT's Redis-synced rule-compilation framework and its RuleScan/Hyperscan-based pattern-matching engine (libmaatframe.so / librulescan), and records that RuleScan's fast-scan feature caused a production outage on 2019-03-19 and has been disabled ever since.

Raw structured DNS event logs (dated 2021-08-23) captured from what appears to be a GFW-adjacent DNS monitoring/injection pipeline use a schema purpose-built for DNS response forgery ('CHEAT_TYPE', 'CHEAT_RCODE', 'CHEAT_STRATEGY', 'CHEAT_RR', 'INJECTED_PKT_FILE' fields) alongside per-query geolocation; sampled records show lookups for facebook.com and tiktokv.com originating from residential China Telecom/Unicom/Mobile subscriber IPs in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Anhui and other provinces, resolving against both domestic and foreign (8.8.8.8, OpenDNS) resolvers.

A 2023 MESA Lab monthly report describes the 'TF' project's active-defense work: test cases for serial ('串联') HTTP hijack/tamper and parallel ('并联') DNS race-injection ('DNS抢答'), performance tuning that scaled active-defense capacity from 3 to 5 units, converting two existing TSG boxes to active-defense mode, and rewriting the active-defense flow-control logic to no longer depend on sapp.

TSG automatically generates recurring weekly "SNI Report of Overseas APP" and companion "Server IP and Location of Overseas APP" reports at what is almost certainly a China-national (not export-customer) scale — single weekly runs process from ~5.7 trillion to over 135 billion rows and up to ~775TB/week — breaking down QUIC.SNI/SSL.SNI/HTTP.Host traffic per named blocked-in-China platform (YouTube, Facebook, Google, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, WhatsApp, Netflix, BBC, Viber, Line, Snapchat, Gmail, HBO, and more), down to individual CDN edge hostnames (e.g. specific scontent-*.fbcdn.net and rr*---sn-*.googlevideo.com nodes ranked by bytes). The report series recurs weekly from at least Feb 2023 through Mar 2024.