geedge.lantern.io
deployment confidence: medium public

The stellar/stellar-dev-env repo pins a paired release of sapp-4.3.38 with a companion component "stellar-c-1.0.13", built via an internal RPM repo hostname (el8.repo.internal.geedge.net.repo) and a "tsg_framework.sh" bootstrap script — evidence of a previously undocumented internal component ("stellar-c") versioned alongside sapp and an internal geedge.net package-repo infrastructure supporting TSG-OS builds.

✨ feat(stellar-c sapp version update): sapp-4.3.38 stellar-c-1.0.13
censorsgeneric
productssapp
capabilitydeployment-config

Cited artifacts

Provenance pointers only — no leak content is rehosted. Raw material: Enlace Hacktivista.

extracted_by: claude-sonnet-5 · added 2026-08-26 · id: 2026-sapp-stellar-version-0eeede

Related findings

detection

Crash-dump stack traces reveal TSG's core packet-processing engine (sapp) architecture: a custom multi-threaded C engine using 'marsio' as the DPDK-style packet-I/O driver, a plugin system for protocol handlers (confirmed: plug/protocol/http/http.so), and a libdocumentanalyze component that actively decompresses gzip content and parses ZIP/document formats found inside HTTP bodies -- i.e. inspection goes beyond headers into reconstructed application content.

detection

TSG implements heuristic tunnel-protocol detection distinguishing Teredo (IPv6-over-UDP, default port 3544) from GTP tunneling based on UDP payload inspection, used to decide 'innermost' session attribution for firewall matching.

evaluation

A June 2021 internal report measures a live in-network TLS-interception pilot: one sapp instance ingests raw ciphertext via mrzcpd while a second ingests plaintext from a "third-party decryption platform" over a Unix domain socket, and one hour of production traffic on a live front-end (10.187.0.2) shows the decryption platform successfully produced plaintext for 4.85% of raw traffic bytes and 7.4% of all port-443 TCP connections, with an average end-to-end decrypt latency of 1741ms (median 460ms, up to 6000ms) between first ciphertext byte and the resulting plaintext HTTP GET.

detection

sapp's plugin API exposes explicit enforcement primitives -- MESA_kill_tcp()/MESA_rst_tcp() to inject a single RST, and MESA_set_stream_opt() with MSO_TCP_RST_REMEDY/MSO_DROP_STREAM to make RST-injection or packet-dropping persist for the remaining lifetime of a flow -- with a global sapp.toml auto_remedy toggle and a per-stream option controlling whether a lone RST is reinforced repeatedly for as long as the flow keeps sending data.

detection

An internal "sapp" developer guide (marked "Geedge Networks Confidential And Proprietary") documents that MESA's core DPI/traffic-processing platform has gone through four generations since roughly 2005 -- start -> papp -> sappv3 -> sappv4 -- with sappv4 (introduced 2019) now the sole actively maintained branch, while some sappv3 deployments still run unless a critical bug forces an upgrade.

detection

sapp's internal architecture guide documents three deployment topologies (mirror/passive-tap, inline, dual-arm transparent) and four distinct methods for injecting blocking packets back onto the wire, including a MAC-in-MAC scheme that extracts device/link IDs from mirrored traffic's source MAC field to route an injected packet to the correct physically separate inline device over VXLAN when multiple injection points exist.