The "stellar" QUIC decoder plugin implements a complete RFC 9001 QUIC Initial-packet header- and payload-deprotection pipeline (HKDF key derivation from the well-known public IETF/gQUIC initial salts, AES-128-GCM payload decryption, AES-CTR header-protection removal) to decrypt QUIC ClientHello messages in real time, reassembling CRYPTO frames fragmented across multiple UDP datagrams, and extracts SNI and User-Agent from the decrypted handshake. It separately parses legacy Google QUIC (gQUIC) CHLO tag-value blobs (TAG_SNI / TAG_UAID) for older/non-IETF QUIC variants, and recognizes version ranges for a long list of QUIC implementations (mvfst, quant, quicly, msquic, mozquic, picoquic). A config flag (DECRYPTED_SWITCH) toggles whether the decrypt-and-inspect pass runs.

A TSG-Application blocklist test found that disabling Facebook/Twitter in TSG's per-app policy did not stop Psiphon3 traffic from reaching those services in practice, because Psiphon3's dual-stack fallback drove the tunneled Facebook traffic over IPv4 QUIC, which TSG's classifier failed to attribute to Facebook -- in contrast to Taobao/Bilibili/Youku/JD, which TSG blocked successfully in the same test.

Crash-dump stack traces reveal TSG's core packet-processing engine (sapp) architecture: a custom multi-threaded C engine using 'marsio' as the DPDK-style packet-I/O driver, a plugin system for protocol handlers (confirmed: plug/protocol/http/http.so), and a libdocumentanalyze component that actively decompresses gzip content and parses ZIP/document formats found inside HTTP bodies -- i.e. inspection goes beyond headers into reconstructed application content.

TSG implements heuristic tunnel-protocol detection distinguishing Teredo (IPv6-over-UDP, default port 3544) from GTP tunneling based on UDP payload inspection, used to decide 'innermost' session attribution for firewall matching.

A production feature spec ("加密协议JG") requires detection-and-control capability for QUIC, ESNI, and ECH, with a per-connection log field c_encrypt_type explicitly distinguishing ClientHello encryption (0=unencrypted, 1=ESNI, 2=ECH) and a DF_QUIC_REGION rule table matching QUIC by SNI. The system computes a per-rule "CT" (穿透/penetration) rate from paired mirror-vs-functional RST-packet logs (TF-RST-LOG / TF-MIRROR-RST-LOG) to grade each block rule's effectiveness, and runs continuous active-verification probes against its own rules, deliberately varying the probe 4-tuple each run "to ensure it doesn't hit the blacklist" so the verification traffic itself reaches the target.

Internal engineering docs detail MAAT's config/policy hierarchy (region/policy-unit -> group/policy-object -> compile/policy, a conjunctive-normal-form structure capped at 8 top-level groups), its Redis-backed one-master-many-replica config push ("MAAT Redis") with a rulescan fallback, and confirm MAAT runs non-distributed -- one instance per front-end traffic-scanning box -- invoked by sapp per-packet or per-stream (Maat_stream_scan_string_detail) with match-all-then-return semantics; recommended hardware is CentOS 7, 256GB RAM, 2TB disk, 48-core Xeon E5.

MESA_Platform's "quic" module (built and packaged as stellar-on-sapp/sapp RPMs) implements SNI/User-Agent extraction from both cleartext GQUIC (versions 23-59) and encrypted IETF QUIC RFC9000 ClientHello payloads, and supports a QUIC SNI whitelist -- i.e. the DPI pipeline decrypts/parses encrypted QUIC handshakes to recover the destination domain rather than being blocked by QUIC's encryption.