A MESA Lab experiment re-identifies individual users across time solely from which domains they visit, using one-hot/frequency "domain access vectors" (Jaccard, overlap-coefficient, cosine, Euclidean) computed against real production HTTP logs pulled from a ClickHouse table named tsg_galaxy_v3.connection_record_log_http_domain. The best-performing configuration (Alexa top 100-10000 domain list, overlap coefficient) distinguished the same user's adjacent-hour sessions from other users' sessions with high separation (~0.19 vs ~0.88 average difference).
这些 HTTP 访问日志存储在 192.168.10.28 服务器上 clickhouse 数据库中的 tsg_galaxy_v3.connection_record_log_http_domain 数据库表中
Defense implications
- Sessions from the same client IP or shared egress can be re-linked across time purely from the set/frequency of visited domains (SNI or DNS-visible), with no content decryption required -- rotating egress IP alone does not defeat this if the domain-access pattern stays stable.
- Consider randomizing/padding DNS and SNI lookup order and injecting decoy domain fetches per session to reduce Jaccard/overlap similarity between sessions belonging to the same underlying user.
Related findings
relationship-gtpc-user derives a single per-subscriber correlation key as Hashkey = md5(IMEI + IMSI + phone_number + vsys_id) from mobile-core GTP-C signaling, and a separate per-tunnel key gtp_uuid = md5(uplink_teid + "|" + downlink_teid). On every update it writes not just the primary user<->TEID row (tsg_galaxy:relation_user_teid) but up to four additional secondary-index rows into tsg_galaxy:gtpc_knowledge_base, one per identifier (IMEI, IMSI, phone number, APN) with a type-digit prefix ("0"/"1"/"2"/"3") and — for phone number and APN — the value's characters reversed before use as the row key, a range-scan-friendly key design that lets any of the four identifiers be used to look up the associated tunnel/session independently.
radius-relationship-hbase (galaxy/tsg_olap) builds a bidirectional, MD5-keyed RADIUS accounting index in HBase — a framed-IP-to-account table and its account-to-IP mirror — so any subscriber account or assigned IP can be looked up in O(1) from either direction, per multi-tenant vsys_id. Each direction is fronted by a Guava write-through cache (10M-entry cap, 24h TTL) so lookups do not hit HBase on the hot path.
log-subscriber-hbase-datacenter is a Storm topology that, on a 300-second tick, scans a "national center" HBase cluster (national.hbase.zookeeper.servers) for subscriber_id/account rows changed in that window and replicates them into a separate "branch/regional datacenter" HBase cluster (center.hbase.zookeeper.servers, table sub:subscriber_info) — confirming a two-tier, hub-and-spoke data-federation architecture where subscriber-account correlation data is centrally maintained at a national level and periodically pushed down to per-datacenter local copies for regional/site-level querying.
The VoIP-fusion correlation key linking a SIP signaling record to its RTP media record is not timing/heuristic-based -- it is an exact match between the negotiated media endpoint fields parsed out of the SIP record (from_rtp_ip/from_rtp_port/to_rtp_ip/to_rtp_port, i.e. the SDP-negotiated RTP endpoints carried in the SIP signaling) and the actual observed RTP flow's four-tuple (common_client_ip/port, common_server_ip/port). A separate normalization rule sorts every four-tuple by port then IP (smaller first) before use as a join key, and common_vsys_id is the default grouping/partition key.
VoipCalibrationWindowFunction only auto-merges a candidate group when it is exactly one-to-many (1 RTP matched to N SIP records, or 1 SIP matched to N RTP records); any other cardinality within a correlation-key bucket (e.g. 2 SIP + 2 RTP) is explicitly logged as anomalous ("Not logical") and every record in that bucket is emitted individually as an unmerged "violation" log rather than being forced into a merge or silently dropped.
VoIP correlation runs in two sequential time windows, not one -- an initial tumbling window (voip.calibration.window.time, configured at 30s) attempts to fuse SIP/RTP records sharing a key, and any record still unmatched after that window is held in a second in-memory cache and retried against a longer secondary window (sec.combine.sr.cache.secs, configured at 60s) before finally being emitted unmerged -- giving the pipeline up to ~90s of tolerance for SIP and RTP legs of the same call arriving out of sync.