TSG's field operations-and-maintenance toolkit (lijia/tsg_oam) runs certstore, kni, tfe, and tsgenv each as independent systemd services on TSG appliances, and includes a dedicated tsg_monit_intercept.py monitoring script alongside per-protocol monitors (tsg_monit_protocol_v3.py/v4.py) and a marsio-based traffic reader (get_traffic_by_marsio.py) -- showing the certstore/interception subsystem is treated as its own independently-monitored production service rather than an incidental sapp sub-feature.

An internal TSG operations/troubleshooting manual lays out TSG's full traffic pipeline (NIC -> mrzcpd/marsio capture driver -> sapp DPI engine -> firewall/proxy(KNI->TFE)/active-defense/WAN-NAT policy branches) and shows engineers using maat_redis_tool to pull the live Redis-synced blocking policy tables (TSG_SECURITY_COMPILE, TSG_OBJ_IP_ADDR, TSG_OBJ_APP_ID) and filter them by numeric policy/object ID to debug why a block rule isn't firing.

The same 224-column TSG per-session log schema carries a full TLS- interception field set — proxy_pinning_status, proxy_intercept_status, proxy_passthrough_reason, proxy_cert_verify, proxy_intercept_error, sc_rsp_raw and sc_rsp_decrypted (raw vs. decrypted server response content) — plus ssl_esni_flag and ssl_ech_flag (explicit ECH/ESNI-usage flags), ssl_ja3_hash/ssl_ja3s_hash, and ssh_hassh (SSH client fingerprinting), confirming certstore-style MITM interception, ECH/ESNI detection, and TLS/SSH fingerprinting are all first-class fields logged on every session, not experimental add-ons.

Crash-dump stack traces reveal TSG's core packet-processing engine (sapp) architecture: a custom multi-threaded C engine using 'marsio' as the DPDK-style packet-I/O driver, a plugin system for protocol handlers (confirmed: plug/protocol/http/http.so), and a libdocumentanalyze component that actively decompresses gzip content and parses ZIP/document formats found inside HTTP bodies -- i.e. inspection goes beyond headers into reconstructed application content.

An internal TSG troubleshooting runbook ("HTTPS证书替换策略无效果") documents the certstore MITM-certificate service actively serving/validating forged certificates keyed by SNI, walking an operator through checking certstore logs for specific real-world domains including Google's update service (update.googleapis.com) and Nvidia's GFE service (services.gfe.nvidia.com), and cross-checking keyring config live via maat_redis_tool.

certstore's own commit history documents its transparent-TLS-MITM mechanics directly: it writes the client's observed SNI into the SAN field of the leaf certificate it mints on the fly, supports ECC issuance (secp192r1/secp256r1) for those forged certs, and reads its Trusted/Untrusted decryption-keyring configuration from MAAT's DECRYPTION_KEYRING table -- confirming the interception pipeline end-to-end: client SNI in, matching forged certificate out, gated by MAAT-synced keyring policy.

An internal "DPI Benchmark" methodology document names the three production components underlying TSG's DPI stack and proposes benchmarking each against open-source equivalents: Marsio (DPDK-based packet I/O) for receive/transmit, Sapp ("网络安全开发平台", a high-speed traffic-processing platform) for protocol parsing and flow-table management, and Maat (Hyperscan-class signature engine with Redis-based multi-machine config sync) for pattern scanning.