The "intelligence-learning-engine/vpn-finder-plugins" repo was initialized specifically for the M22 (Myanmar) deployment ("Init: M22初始化", branches "24.08_M22"/"tsg24.02_M22") and implements per-service detection plugins for at least nine commercial VPN products (CyberGhost, ProtonVPN, TurboVPN, Windscribe, IPVanish, Ivacy, VPN Unlimited, GeckoVPN, Hotspot Shield) plus Psiphon3, feeding discovered server identifiers into a central "knowledge base" that field deployments sync from on their own release cadence.
Commits: "Init: M22初始化" (Init: M22 initialization), [email protected], 2024-03-29; "Add: 增加Psiphon3plugin配置，统一输出监控" (add Psiphon3 plugin config, unify output monitoring), 2024-03-29; "修改:Turbo VPN新增www.myanmar.com识别特征" (Turbo VPN added www.myanmar.com identification feature), 2024-11-06. File tree: detection/vpnservices/cyberghostvpn.py, detection/vpnservices/protonvpn.py, detection/vpnservices/windscribevpn.py, detection/vpnservices/turbovpn.py
Defense implications
- The M22 (Myanmar) deployment maintains live, per-VPN-provider detection signatures that are actively iterated with Myanmar-specific features (e.g. a Myanmar-domain feature added to TurboVPN detection); assume individualized signature coverage per VPN brand in this region rather than generic VPN-category blocking.
Related findings
Under the internal "M22" project (deployment site "YGN-MYTEL" confirms this is Myanmar, at the Mytel carrier), Geedge runs a continuous, individually-tracked signature-extraction pipeline against named commercial VPN apps (Super Unlimited VPN, NotVPN, Avira Phantom, Bitdefender VPN, Thunder VPN, Panda VPN, Mouse VPN, HaloVPN, GoFly VPN, Kiwi/Kuto/Greennet/Gulf Super/Hatunnel+ VPN, and a customer-provided list of 141 more): active probing of app refresh/connect behavior (including automated UI-driving scripts) extracts server IP/FQDN lists, separately for free vs. paid tiers and Android vs. iOS, which are then loaded as blocklist objects and validated against a false-positive ("CT"/穿透) test pass in a separate demo environment before deployment.
Project "M22" runs a standing weekly program to extract and patch detection signatures against "Turbo VPN": automated dial-testing continuously discovers server IPs (tens to hundreds/week), each batch packaged into a dated JSON patch file, validated for both blocking efficacy and false-positive risk before rollout. Ran continuously Aug-Nov 2024 in the source ticket.
The same M22 weekly-extraction program runs in parallel against "7VPN": automated dial-tests repeatedly found its free-tier nodes already non-functional/blocked across weekly checks Aug-Oct 2024, indicating sustained monitoring even absent a signature update.
M22 runs a large-scale automated pipeline against numerous commercial VPN apps: APK decompilation + HTTPS-proxy interception to extract servers/FQDNs, automated dial-testing at volume (one app: 17,554 dial-tests, 4,073 servers discovered, 94% 24-hour block rate), and OpenCV-based automated ad-dismissal to keep test automation running unattended.
The same M22-tagged VPN-finder plugin set implements active UDP probing to elicit and harvest server IP addresses from CyberGhost VPN's protocol behavior, and separately fingerprints Windscribe VPN via TLS certificate features — two distinct active-probing/fingerprinting techniques feeding the same central VPN-blocklist knowledge base, with an explicit configurable active-scan packet rate.
A dial-testing ('拨测') log documents systematic active-probing/reachability testing from a 'YGN-GTG' (Yangon Gateway, Myanmar) network node against six overseas test sites in Singapore, France, the US, New Zealand, South Africa, and Chile, using packet capture plus flow statistics to quantify one-way vs two-way flow completion (0-45%% flow loss observed per site) through gateway node IPs 'YGN-GTG: 10.173.12.x' -- direct empirical evidence of connectivity/blocking-effectiveness QA testing tied to the Myanmar (M22) Yangon deployment, run against an 'NCSC'-provided 'Campana' test WiFi network.