Two paired MAAT signatures, "warp_masque_m" and "warp_ip", detect Cloudflare WARP/MASQUE traffic: one matches destination IP 162.159.198.1 (a published Cloudflare WARP anycast address) combined with an internal app_id classification (140/15629), the other matches the same infrastructure via IP protocol number alone -- i.e. WARP is detected both by a fixed anycast IP and by an app-ID classifier layered on top of it.
"signature_name": "warp_masque_m" ... "attribute_name": "ip.dst" ... "source_object_ids": [20457] ... "attribute_name": "common.app_id", "source_object_ids": [140, 15629] ... "signature_name": "warp_ip"
Defense implications
- Fixed well-known anycast IPs (like Cloudflare WARP's) are trivial to signature; any circumvention transport sharing infrastructure with a large, fixed, publicly-documented IP range should not assume that shared reputation protects it from being IP-matched independent of protocol content.
Related findings
A dedicated AppSketch/MAAT signature object named 'Psiphon-Volunteer-IP' (signature_id 4054) blocklists specific IPv4/IPv6 CIDR ranges by ip.dst regardless of port (192.122.190.0/24, 2001:48a8:687f:1::/64, 141.219.0.0/16, and more), i.e. Geedge maintains infrastructure-level blocking of known Psiphon volunteer-hosted proxy server ranges rather than relying solely on app/protocol fingerprinting.
A signature object dated 2024-10-28 and named 'VPN servers in Russia' (fqdn variant signature_id 6217, IP variant 6216) blocklists specific FQDNs (api.tap2free.net, vpnlocal.app) and a companion IP-address object, showing Geedge curates geography-scoped VPN-infrastructure collections by country rather than only per-app-brand signatures — i.e. any server identified as VPN infrastructure hosted in a given country can be swept into a blocklist independent of which client app uses it.
The batch contains 200+ individual MAAT/AppSketch signature JSON files, most defining FQDN- and/or destination-IP-based blocking rules for a single named commercial/consumer VPN app each (LetsVPN, TurboVPN, QuarkVPN, PandaVPN, StarkVPNReloaded, VPNTurkey, BitdefenderVPN, SnapVPN, SuperSpeedVPNProxy, SuperUnlimitedVPN, CafeVPN, and dozens more), each carrying a build date — the dated files span June 2024 through November 2024 — showing a large, actively and continuously maintained per-app VPN signature catalog rather than a static blocklist.
Geedge's MAAT/AppSketch signature system contains a dedicated, dated ruleset naming Lantern by product: signature_id 7312 "Lantern_fqdn_20241104" matches common.server_fqdn against the literal keyword "$lantern.io", and a companion signature_id 7240 "Lantern_ip_20241104" matches ip.dst against a static list of 1,604 individual IPv4 addresses, both dated 2024-11-04. The same signature file appears twice in the leak at two different artifact paths (identical content, not independent corroboration). Independent whois verification of all 1,604 IPs (not itself present in the leak document -- done by the extracting analyst against current registry data) found they collapse into only 38 distinct /16 ranges, of which ranges totaling 86.7% of the IPs return an explicit Oracle Corporation whois org record (netnames like OC-195, OC-260, ORACLE-4, ORACLE-MY, ORACLE-SE, OPC1); the remaining 13.3% are unattributed legacy RIPE/APNIC-ERX blocks with no other org found, consistent with the same historical-Oracle-lease pattern as the confirmed ranges. The individual IPs are a stale point-in-time snapshot given Lantern's IP rotation, but the provider concentration is the durable signal: this enumeration was effectively a sweep of Oracle Cloud Infrastructure's address space, not a list of arbitrarily-located relays.
Internal MAAT engineering specification (v3.1.20, MESA Lab, revision history spanning 2014-2021) documents the config schema underlying sapp's rule-matching engine: per-rule action types (0=block/阻断, 1=monitor/监测, 2=whitelist/白名单), string/regex/IP/numeric/digest match types, and a geographic+ISP "tag" targeting system that lets the identical rule set be selectively activated per city district and carrier (e.g. Beijing/Chaoyang + China Telecom vs. Shanghai/Pudong), enabling narrowly-scoped rule rollout/testing before wider deployment.
A crash/perf bug report reveals Geedge's MAAT rule engine (libmaatframe.so, using Intel Hyperscan for literal/regex matching) running with 545,441 FQDN blocking rules and 404,141 IP address blocking rules loaded in a single instance as of 2024; loading 500,000 new FQDN rules via the full Hyperscan path took ~95 minutes, addressed by an automatic fallback to a second engine ("Rulescan") above 50,000 rules.